Team of Rivals or Team Players:
The Limits of Gubernatorial Partisan Control in Divided State Executive Branches

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Abstract

Recent scholarship has found that the partisan control of state governors' offices influences the ideological direction of state policy. This literature, however, often ignores a key characteristic of state politics: the plural executive. In a majority of states, key executive branch posts are independently elected rather than appointed by the governor. As a result, governors must often contend with state executives of the opposing political party when implementing their policy agenda. In this paper, I examine how the policy effects of state governors are conditioned by the party of elected state executives. Coupling existing measures of state policy liberalism with data on the partisan control of state attorneys general, secretaries of state, and state treasurers from 1974 to 2019, I estimate a series of panel models to assess how these executives influence gubernatorial control. I find that while Democratic and Republican governors do lead to liberal and conservative policy change, respectively, this policy effect among Democrats is conditioned on whether or not the state attorney general is a fellow Democrat. When the attorney general is a Republican, Democratic governors are limited in their ability to bring about liberal policy change. This dynamic is particularly salient in states with part-time legislatures, where the attorney general plays a more central role in providing a check on the governor. There is no such relationship, however, secretaries of state or state treasurers, each of whom have little to no effect on state policy liberalism.

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1 Introduction

Scholars have long studied the effects of partisan control on policy outcomes, particularly the policy effects of state governors (Garand, 1988; Besley and Case, 2003; Leigh, 2008; Fredriksson et al., 2013; Lax and Phillips, 2011). Recent research has shown that electing a Democratic governor indeed leads to more liberal state policy than electing a Republican (or Independent) (Caughey et al., 2017). This literature, however, often ignores a unique characteristic of state politics: the plural executive. Governors seldom wield the same control over state executive branches that presidents do at the federal level. Namely, presidents enjoy broad appointment power over key positions in the federal government, and though they may encounter bureaucratic resistance to their policies and programs (Neustadt, 1990; Heclo, 1977), they can select appointees who agree with the president's agenda and are committed to carrying it out (Lewis, 2008). The majority of state governors, however, must contend with state executives that are independently elected, with 43 states electing their attorney general, 35 states electing the secretary of state, and 36 electing the state treasurer, and 30 states electing all three positions. When these executives are of the same political party as the governor, and thus presumably aligned with the governor on most policy issues, they may augment the governor's ability to push policy in their preferred ideological direction. However, when these executives are not politically aligned with the governor, they can present a significant obstacle for governors to overcome in implementing their policy agenda. Whether governors receive an executive team comprised of friendly co-partisans or bureaucratic rivals is entirely up to the state's voters.

In this paper, I examine how the partisan control of elected state executive offices influences a governor's ability to produce ideological policy change. I hypothesize that in states that elect the offices of attorney general, secretary of state, and treasurer, respectively, the effect of having a Democratic governor on policy liberalism will be conditional on whether

these executives are co-partisans of the governor. To test these hypotheses, I couple existing datasets of state partisan control (e.g., governor, state legislature) with data on the party control of state attorneys general, secretaries of state, and treasurers, from 1974 to 2019. Using the dynamic measure of state policy liberalism from Caughey and Warshaw (2016), I estimate a series of panel models to evaluate the effect of state executive partisan control on policy outputs. My analysis yields a number of key findings. Consistent with recent scholarship, I find that Democratic governors indeed produce liberal policy change. However, this effect is largely conditional on having a fellow Democrat as the state's attorney general. When the attorney general is a Republican (or Independent), this positive effect disappears entirely. Democratic control of secretaries of state and treasurers offices, however, appear to have no statistically significant effect on state policy liberalism.

These findings have a number of important implications for the study of state policy-making and partisan control. Namely, this research shows that previous studies examining the effect of gubernatorial control on policy outcomes are omitting a key variable—one that significant impacts a governor's ability to push state policy in their preferred ideological direction. Governors often need the assistance of the state attorneys general to enact, enforce, and defend key elements of their policy agenda. Thus, being of the same political party, especially in today's polarized political environment, makes cooperation between these two key actors more likely. Not accounting for this unique characteristic of state politics may thus explain why a number of studies examining the policy effects of gubernatorial control have reached inconclusive or contradictory results. Moreover, this also suggests that applying theories of the presidency to gubernatorial politics may not be appropriate in most contexts.

2   Relevant Literature

Scholars have long studied the effect of partisan control on state policy outcomes. The central question of this literature has been whether Democratic or Republican control of state governing institutions leads to policy shifts in each party's respective ideological direction. In other words, does Democratic control lead to more liberal policy and Republican control lead to more conservative policy? Much of the literature in this area, however, has yielded inconclusive results. Hofferbert (1966), examining policy liberalism in terms of state welfare policies, found no relationship between said policies and the party in control. Similarly, Winters (1976) found party control to have no effect on taxes and spending. Garand (1988) also found there to be no significant relationship between the party in control of the governor and state legislature and growth in the size of government (measured in terms of state expenditures). Others have found these results to be contextual. For instance, Dye (1984) examined party control and state welfare spending from 1950 to 1980. He concluded that while party control does matter for state welfare spending, the effects appears only in some states, but not others.

Using tax and spending data from 1950 to 1998, Besley and Case (2003) estimated fixed effects models to assess the effects of partisan control on state policy outputs. They found that while Democratic state legislatures are associated with higher taxes and spending on family assistance, Democratic governors have no such effect. However, they did find that Democratic governors lead to more generous workers' compensation programs for state employees. Leigh (2008) examined the effect of gubernatorial partisan control on a number of policy outcomes, such as tax rates, welfare benefits, and the size of government. Estimating fixed effects models with data from 1941 to 2002, he found gubernatorial party to have little effect on policy outcomes. Lax and Phillips (2011) found that partisan control of the governor and state legislature has no statistically significant effect on whether a state

government adopts the liberal position on a number of policy issues (though government ideology, more broadly, does lead to more liberalism). Others, such as Erikson et al. (1993), have even found a negative relationship between Democratic control and policy liberalism.

Fredriksson et al. (2013) found that the effect of gubernatorial partisan control depends on whether a governor is re-electable or a lame duck. In terms of tax policy, they found that while Democratic governors who are re-electable increase tax rates relative to Republicans, those who are term-limited show no such effect. Meanwhile, others have shown that the partisan control of state governors can have a significant effect on policy outcomes vis-a-vis the federal government. For instance, Barrilleaux and Rainey (2014) found that gubernatorial party was the main predictor of whether a governor accepted or rejected the Medicaid expansion under the 2010 Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare").

Perhaps the most comprehensive study to date on the effects of partisan control has been from Caughey et al. (2017). Equipped with a new, dynamic measure of state policy liberalism Caughey and Warshaw (2016), Caughey et al. (2017) examined state partisan control from 1936 to 2014, using a regression discontinuity design, as well as a series of dynamic panel models, to estimate the effect of partisan control on state policy liberalism. Overall, they found that Democratic governors and state legislatures do have positive and statistically significant effects on state policy liberalism. However, they also showed that these effects were negligible until roughly the 1980s, upon which the effect of partisan control grew significantly.

This literature, however, has largely ignored the role of plural executives. Each of these aforementioned studies do not account for the fact that 42 governors must not only bargain with state legislatures, but with independently elected state executives, whom can play a significant role not only in the passage of governors' agendas, but in their implementation. When these executives are of the same party as the governor (and thus presumably aligned with the governor on most policy issues), they may augment the governor's influence

in pushing policy in their preferred ideological direction. However, when these executives are of the opposite party as the governor, they may inhibit governors from implementing their agenda. Nevertheless, by not accounting for this reality, many of these previous works are missing a key variable that may explain many of the null findings, as well as many of the contextual results.

3   Team of Rivals or Team Players?

Like presidents, state governors serve as a state's chief executive and top political officer. As (Kousser and Phillips, 2012, p. 2) note, governors "are the central figures of state politics." Governors not only execute the state's laws and enforce its regulations, but they also oversee the state's executive branch, appoint a wide number of executive officials to run the state's administrative agencies, develop proposals for the state budget, and, in many states, appoint judges to the state's courts. Governors are also responsible for making decisions on important federalism issues. For instance, governors played a pivotal role in the implementation of the 2010 Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare") in their decisions over whether to accept or reject federal funding for the expansion of Medicaid (Barrilleaux and Rainey, 2014; Rigby, 2012; Rigby and Haselswerdt, 2013; Travis et al., 2016). As a result, governors are often held chiefly responsible for state performance, such as the state of the economy (Brown, 2010).

Though governors—like presidents—face weaknesses in the legislative process, such as the inability to directly introduce legislation, they do have a number of important political tools for achieving their policy aims. Namely, as one of the state's most high-profile politicians, governors have the ability to command attention in ways that other state politicians cannot; when governors speak, the state listens. Governors, according to (Kousser and Phillips, 2012, p. 30), often see their "policy priorities and the proposals they make become

news." This ultimately provides them with considerable agenda-setting power. Moreover, governors also wield negative power through the veto, the threat of which allows them to extract policy concessions from the legislature (Cameron, 2001).

These tools have allowed governors to be particularly influential vis-a-vis state legislatures. Tracking the success and failure of over 1,000 policy proposals outlined in governors' state of the state addresses, Kousser and Phillips (2012) found that governors often got most—or at least some—of what they wanted, with state legislatures passing what governors asked for roughly 41 percent of time, while another 18 percent of policy proposals were granted as part of some compromise deal. Governors were even more successful in securing their budget requests, with Kousser and Phillips (2012) finding that governors received 70 cents for each dollar of spending or revenue proposed. This leads to my first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *A Democratic (Republican) governor will lead to more (less) policy liberalism than a Republican (Democratic) or Independent governor.*

Though researchers have often compared state governors to presidents, this comparison is problematic for a number of reasons. Primarily, governors, unlike presidents (who appoint individuals to key posts in the executive branch), often do not have total control over the state's executive branch. Rather, many states have plural executives, in which key executive positions, particularly the attorney general, secretary of state, and state treasurer, are independently elected rather than appointed by the governor. As (Bowman et al., 2010, p. 305) highlight, power, in state politics, "is not only separated among institutions but dispersed within the executive branch. Most governors not only contend with a host of separately elected officials; they also encounter many agency heads whose appointment (or removal) is beyond their control." As shown in Figure 1, 43 states directly elect their attorney general. Only five state AGs—Alaska, Hawaii, Wyoming, New Jersey, and New

Figure 1: Selection Method of State Attorneys General

Hampshire—are appointed by the governor, while the AGs of Maine and Tennessee are se-lected by the state legislature and state Supreme Court, respectively. 35 states, highlighted in Figure 2, elect their secretary of state. Only nine secretaries of state are appointed by the governor, while those of Tennessee, New Hampshire, and Maine are elected by the state legislature. The position does not exist in Alaska, Hawaii, and Utah, with the duties carried out by other state agencies. Similarly, 36 states, shown in Figure 3, elect the state treasurer, while nine are appointed by the governor, and three are elected by the state legislature. The position does not exist in New York, with the duties performed by the state comptroller's of-fice. Finally, 30 states, shown in Figure 4, elect all three executive posts. With the majority of them being elected, they have their own voice and constituencies, which may be different

Figure 2: Selection Method of Secretaries of State

from that of the governor, especially if they are not of the same political party.

Each of these positions are responsible for different areas of state policy, ranging from law enforcement and criminal justice, to administering elections and state records, to investment of state resources and financial regulation (among others). In addition to their formal duties of carrying out state law, each of these positions may develop their own programs for dealing with various policy issues or serve as important advocates for policy change in their respective policy areas. If they are of the same party as the governor, they are more likely—especially in a polarized political environment—to hold similar policy views and answer to the same electoral constituencies, which should allow them to work cooperatively to push state policy in their party's preferred ideological direction. When they

Figure 3: Selection Method of State Treasurers

are not of the same party of the governor, it is likely to cause bureaucratic friction, with state executives trying to push policy in their own (and often conflicting) directions, or working to block the governor's more ideological policy proposals. This means that while governors are particularly influential in state politics, there are often significant aspects of state policy, ranging from law enforcement, criminal justice, elections, and financial regulation (among others) that are outside of their control.

This dynamic is exacerbated in states with less professionalized, part-time legislatures, where governors have more power vis-a-vis the legislature (Kousser and Phillips, 2012). With weaker, part-time legislatures, elected state executives, particularly the state AG, play a more sizable role in checking the power of an opposing-party governor. As (Marshall,

Figure 4: States Electing All Three Executive Offices

2006, p. 2473) notes, an independently-elected state AG serves as an important intrabranch check on executive overreach at the state level in that state legislatures "are often part-time and therefore unable to effectively police the actions of the full-time officers of the executive branch." For example, in 2017, Kentucky's Democratic AG Andy Beshear sued Republican Governor Matt Bevin multiple times over changes made to the public education system while the state's part-time legislature was not in session, including cuts in education funding for the state's public colleges and universities and re-organization of state education boards (Greenblatt, 2016). Beshear ultimately won a number of these lawsuits, causing Bevin to change course and scale back his initial decisions (Brammer and Spears, 2017). In all, this leads to hypothesis 2-4:

<u>Hypothesis 2</u>: *In states that elect their attorney general, the policy effect of having a Democratic (Republican) governor will be stronger when the attorney general is a Democrat (Republican).*

<u>Hypothesis 3</u>: *In states that elect their secretary of state, the policy effect of having a Democratic (Republican) governor will be stronger when the secretary of state is a Democrat (Republican).*

<u>Hypothesis 4</u>: *In states that elect their treasurer, the policy effect of having a Democratic (Republican) governor will be stronger when the treasurer is a Democrat (Republican).*

4   Data and Methodology

The dependent variable in my analysis is the annual measure of state policy liberalism from Caughey and Warshaw (2016), from 1974 to 2019. Prior to this innovation, studies of state policy liberalism were largely limited to cross-sectional analyses (Hofferbert, 1966; Erikson et al., 1993; Gray et al., 2004). Collecting state-level data on 148 different policies across a range of social and economic policy areas, Caughey and Warshaw (2016) employed latent-variable estimation to develop annual ideal point estimates of each state's policy orientation, with higher values signifying more liberal policy and lower values indicating more conservative policy. To ensure that my outcome variable is stationary, I use the first differences of the Caughey and Warshaw (2016) measure.[1]

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[1]Caughey et al. (2017) argue that though this variable exhibits strong temporal dependence, it does not encounter any issues of nonstationarity. The unit root tests of Levin et al. (2002) on the Caughey and Warshaw (2016) measure, however, indicate that the null hypothesis of nonstationarity cannot

The main explanatory variables in this analysis capture the partisan control of state governing institutions. The first set of predictors, all dichotomous, resemble more traditional measures of partisan control. Each variable is coded as 1 if Democrats (Republicans) control the governorship, the state House, and the state Senate, respectively, and 0 if otherwise. Data for each of these variables were collected from a combination of Klarner (2013) and the National Conference of State Legislatures (2020). Expanding on these more traditional predictors, I also account for the partisan control of state attorneys general, secretaries of state, and treasurers. While many states have an array of statewide elected officials, such as auditors, insurance commissioners, school superintendents, labor commissioners, and agricultural commissioners (to name but a few), I focus on these three statewide executive offices because they are the most common and are widely viewed as the highest-ranking statewide executives in most states.[2] These dichotomous variables are each equal to 1 if the state executive is a Democrat (Republican) and 0 if otherwise. Data for these variables were collected from the *Book of the States*. I limit my analysis to those states where these positions are independently-elected offices (excluding Nebraska due to its unicameral legislature).

I also account for a number of covariates. To control for differences in the professionalization of state legislatures (see Squire, 2007), I include the first dimension of Bowen and

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be rejected ($p > 0.05$). Thus, I use the first differences to safeguard against any potential issues around nonstationarity. Nevertheless, I replicate the analyses using the levels of the variable in the appendix.

[2]For a number of reasons, I do not include the position of lieutenant governor in this analysis. Primarily, these positions are not well-defined in scope and formal responsibilities, varying significantly from state to state (Mercer, 2015). Further, unlike the positions discussed above, while many lieutenant governors are elected positions, many are elected on a joint ticket with the governor, which means that they are often co-partisans by default.

Greene's (2014) measure of state legislative professionalism.[3] I control for *Citizen Ideology* using the state ideology scores from Berry et al. (1998), as previous work has shown citizen ideology to influence state policy (Barrilleaux, 1997; Witko and Newmark, 2005; Erikson et al., 1993).[4] Finally, I also account for the effect of union activity on policy liberalism (Radcliff and Saiz, 1998; Witko and Newmark, 2005) using the state union density estimates from Hirsch et al. (2001).

With this set of predictors, I estimate the following baseline panel model to test the effect of partisan control on changes in state policy liberalism:

$$\Delta y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Governor_{i,t} + \beta_2 House_{i,t} + \beta_3 Senate_{i,t} + \beta_4 AG_{i,t} + \beta_5 Sec.State_{i,t} \quad (1)$$
$$+ \beta_6 Treasurer_{i,t} + X_{i,t}\Psi + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

where $\Delta y_{i,t}$ is the change in a state's policy liberalism between year t and $t-1$, $Governor_{i,t}$, $House_{i,t}$, $Senate_{i,t}$, $AG_{i,t}$, $Sec.State_{i,t}$, and $Treasurer_{i,t}$ are my dichotomous indicators for partisan control of the governorship, state House, state Senate, attorney general, secretary of state, and treasurer, respectively, for state i in year t. In iterations of this baseline model, I include interactive terms between the gubernatorial and state executive control to examine the hypothesized conditional effects between these state executive offices. Finally, Ψ is a vector of coefficients for my covariates $X_{i,t}$, α_i are fixed effects for each state, and $\epsilon_{i,t}$ is the error term, clustered on states.[5]

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[3]Because this variable only extends to 2014, I use a two-biennium moving average to extrapolate estimates for the 2015-2016, 2017-2018, and 2019 legislative bienniums. Missing values were populated with the last available estimates for that particular legislature.

[4]Updated scores for this variable from Berry et al. (1998) are only available through 2016. Estimates for 2017-2019 were extrapolated using a three-year moving average.

[5]Many panel studies using state data also include year fixed effects. Recent work has shown, however,

5 Results

Table 1 and Table 2 report the results of my models for Democratic and Republican control, respectively. Each specification is run on the subset of states in which that state executive is elected. For instance, models 1 and 2 include all 42 states that elect their attorney general on a statewide ballot. Likewise, models 3 and 4 include all 36 states where the secretary of state is elected, while models 5 and 6 include all 37 states that elect their state treasurer. Finally, models 7 and 8 include the 32 states in which all three of these executive positions are elected. In addition to the baseline model described in equation (1), I also included specifications that incorporate interaction terms between the party of each elected executive and the party of the governor, which allows me to assess the conditional nature of gubernatorial policy effects. Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Appendix A.1.

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that the use of two-way fixed effects often presents a number of methodological problems (unless key underlying assumptions are met) (Imai and Kim, 2020) and produce regression estimates that are difficult to interpret (Kropko and Kubinec, 2020). Thus, for ease of interpretation, I only present results using one-way fixed effects. I show in the appendix, however, that the results are robust when including year effects as well.

Table 1: The Effects of Democratic Governors and State Executives on State Policy Liberalism, 1974-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.01***	-0.00	0.01***	0.02**	0.01***	0.01	0.01**	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Sec. of State	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Treasurer	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. AG		0.02**						0.02*
		(0.01)						(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. Sec. of State				-0.00				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. Treasurer						0.01		-0.00
						(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	1,884	1,884	1,562	1,562	1,648	1,648	1,365	1,365
States	42	42	36	36	37	37	32	32
R^2	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2: The Effects of Republican Governors and State Executives on State Policy Liberalism, 1974-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.01***	-0.02**	-0.01**	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	0.00	-0.01*	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Secretary of State	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP AG		0.02**						0.03*
		(0.01)						(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Sec. of State				-0.01				-0.02
				(0.01)				(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Treasurer						0.01		0.00
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,884	1,884	1,562	1,562	1,648	1,648	1,365	1,365
States	42	42	36	36	37	37	32	32
R-squared	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The results of the baseline models in Table 1 provide strong support for my first hypothesis among Democrats. The linear coefficients for Democratic governors are positive and statistically significant at the .05-level in models 1, 3, 5, and 7, which indicates that Democratic governors, on average, produce more liberal policy change than Republican (Independent) governors in states that elect the attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer, and all three positions, respectively. The results also show that Democratic control of the state legislature is particularly important for ideological policymaking as well. Across all models, Democratic legislative majorities in the state house and state senate exhibit strong and highly statistically significant effects on the change in policy liberalism. These effects, all of roughly equal magnitude, are generally consistent with those found in recent literature (Caughey et al., 2017).

Unlike governors and state legislative chambers, Democratic control of attorneys general, secretaries of state, and state treasurers appear to have little independent effect on state policy liberalism, as the coefficients in each of the baseline models are negligible and do not reach statistical significance. Multiple factors may help explain these null results. The lack of an effect for attorneys general may be attributed to both parties adopting a comparably "tough on crime" approach for much of this time period (Leigh, 2008). From about the 1960s to the 1990s, crime was a major political issue, with politicians responding to an American public that wanted more punitive policies (Enns, 2016). Crime, in particular, has long been seen as a vulnerability for the Democratic Party, with Democrats in the late 1980s and early 1990s facing "devastating" political consequences for appearing too soft (Beinart, 2015). In an effort to neutralize the issue, national Democrats championed harsher crime and sentencing reforms—with many states following suit (Johnson, 2014)—that even President Bill Clinton, a key advocate for the reforms, later admitted may have been overly punitive (Baker, 2015). For secretaries of state and treasurers, however, the null effects likely stem from differences in the scope of their policy responsibilities. Unlike to the attor-

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ney general, who may be legally involved in a wide range of policy areas, the duties of these other positions are relatively limited. For instance, despite being one a state's top elected officials, the secretary of state is largely responsible for duties that are administrative and non-ideological,[6] such as record-keeping, business regulation, and the administration and certification of elections. Though state treasurers, by comparison, play a more influential role via their management of the state's finances, their involvement is still limited primarily to economic and fiscal policymaking.

The results in Table 1 also provide partial support for hypotheses 2-4, which assert that the policy effects of gubernatorial control are conditional on the party of these other elected executives. Hence, the coefficients for Democratic governors in models 2, 4, 6, and 8 are of particular interest. Unlike the baseline specifications, these coefficients represent the policy effect of having a Democratic governor when each respective elected state executive is *not* a Democrat. Thus, the results from model 2 provide strong support for my second hypothesis. The coefficient for a Democratic governor is negligible and no longer statistically significant when the attorney general is a Republican or Independent. Additionally, the coefficient on the interactive term is both positive and statistically significant, which indicates that the policy effect of a Democratic governor strengthens when the attorney general is a fellow Democrat.

The results provide no support, however, for hypothesis 3, as the coefficient for a Democratic governor in model 4 is both positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, the coefficient on the interactive term is not in the expected direction and lacks statistical significance. This suggests that Democratic governors in states that elect their secretaries of state are not inhibited from implementing a liberal policy agenda when the secretary of state

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[6]Though the duties are largely administrative, secretaries of state have often found themselves at the center of intense partisan competition in recent years, with a number of officeholders having been accused of using their positions for political advantage. For example, see (Greenblatt, 2018).

is of the opposing party. Likewise, there is only weak support for hypothesis 4. The positive coefficient for a Democratic governor in model 6 fails to reach statistical significance when the treasurer is a Republican or Independent. While the positive interactive effect indicates that the effect of Democratic governor strengthens slightly when the state treasurer is a Democrat, the coefficient does not reach statistical significance. These results are consistent in states that elect all three positions. When all three state executive positions are controlled by Republicans (Independents), Democratic governors lead to virtually no significant change in state policy liberalism. Moreover, the results in model 8 generally align with those of models 2, 4, and 6, with Democratic attorneys general augmenting the policy effect of a Democratic governor while Democratic secretaries of state and treasurers yield minimal effects.

Table 2 shows the results for Republican control. There is strong support for hypothesis 1, as the coefficients for a Republican governor in models 1, 3, 5, and 7 are in the conservative direction (negative) in each model specification and statistically significant. This is also true of Republican majorities in the state house and state senate, with statistically significant shifts in the conservative ideological direction. Like Democratic control, however, there is no evidence that Republican attorneys general, secretaries of state, and treasurers have an independent effect on policy liberalism, as many of the effects are not in the conservative direction and none are statistically significant.

There is not much evidence, however, for hypotheses 2-4 among Republicans. In models 2, 4, 6, and 8, the coefficients for Republican governors are in the conservative direction and statistically significant, which indicates that they continue to shift state policy in a conservative ideological direction when the attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer, and all three positions are not Republicans. This stands in contrast with the results among Democratic governors shown above. Moreover, the coefficients on the interaction terms also do not support my hypotheses. While the coefficients on secretaries of state are in the conservative direction, they are weak and not statistically significant. Meanwhile, the

coefficients for AGs and treasurers are actually in the liberal direction, and, in the case of AGs, statistically significant.

Nevertheless, the coefficients in Table 1 and Table 2 provide only limited information from which to draw conclusions about the statistical and substantive significance of the interactive effects (see Brambor et al., 2006). To get a clearer picture of my findings, I now turn to Figure 5, which plots the marginal effects of gubernatorial partisan control, conditional on the partisan control of each elected state executive office. Consistent with my second hypothesis, these effects among Democrats reveal an important dynamic between Democratic governors and state attorneys general. Namely, the marginal effect of a Democratic governor is relatively weak and not statistically significant when the state attorney general is a Republican or Independent. When the attorney general is a fellow Democrat, however, the marginal effect of having a Democratic governor is positive and statistically significant. Importantly, pairwise comparisons indicate that these effects are statistically distinguishable from each other ($p < 0.05$). A similar dynamic is evident with state treasurers. The effect of a Democratic governor is positive but not statistically significant when the treasurer is not a fellow Democrat. When the state treasurer is a co-partisan, the marginal effect of having a Democratic governor grows considerably and is statistically significant, though these effects are not statistically distinguishable from each other. The party of the secretary of state, however, does not appear to be particularly consequential, as the policy effect of a Democratic governor is positive and statistically significant regardless of whether the secretary of state is a Democrat or Republican.

The right column of Figure 5 shows the marginal effects for Republican control. As discussed above, the effects of a Republican governor are consistently negative and statistically significant when the AG, secretary of state, and treasurer are Democrats or Independents. For AGs and state treasurers, the marginal effects actually shift in the liberal direction when these positions are held by Republicans and are not statistically significant.

Figure 5: Marginal Effects of a Democratic Governor by State Executive Party, 1974-2019

(a) Dem. Governor by AG Party*

(b) GOP Governor by AG Party

(c) Dem. Governor by Sec. of State Party

(d) GOP Governor by Sec. of State Party

(e) Dem. Governor by Treasurer Party

(f) GOP Governor by Treasurer Party

Note: 95% confidence intervals reflect robust standard errors (clustered on states).
* pairwise comparison between marginal effects statistically significant at $p < 0.05$.

Figure 6: Marginal Effect of a Democratic Governor by State Executive Party in States Electing All Three Positions, 1974-2019

Note: 95% confidence intervals reflect robust standard errors (clustered on states). Higher values indicate liberal policy shifts, lower values indicate conservative policy shifts.

For secretaries of state, the marginal effect is largely unchanged across party control. Moreover, pairwise comparisons show that none of these results are statistically distinguishable from each other ($p > 0.05$).

Figure 6 plots the marginal effects of Democratic governors in various scenarios of partisan control in states that elected all three positions, where executive power is the most diffuse. As this figure illustrates, when a Democratic governor has a team of state executives comprised of the opposing party, they have a relatively difficult time enacting liberal policy

Figure 7: Marginal Effect of a Republican Governor by State Executive Party in States Electing All Three Positions, 1974-2019

Note: 95% confidence intervals reflect robust standard errors (clustered on states). Higher values indicate liberal policy shifts, lower values indicate conservative policy shifts.

changes, as the marginal effect is only weakly positive and not statistically significant. This changes, however, as the balance of partisan control of the state executive branch shifts further in the governor's favor. The policy effects of a Democratic governor when only one of the three state officers is a Democrat do not differ much from the marginal effects presented above, with the attorney general having the most sizable impact on the governor's ability to bring about liberal policy change. Even when the secretary of state and treasurer are Republicans, having a Democratic AG alone shifts a Democratic governor's policy effect

considerably in the liberal direction, though this effect is just short of conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.10$). Indeed, every partisan configuration that leads to sizeable liberal policy shifts includes a Democratic AG, though the same is not true of the secretary of state or treasurer. The party of other state executives, by contrast, does not appear to be particularly consequential. The only positive effect that reaches conventional levels of statistical significance is when all three state executives align with the governor. Overall, this suggests that governors have a much more difficult time enacting liberal policy change when forced to work with an attorney general that is not a co-partisan.

Figure 7 plots the marginal effects of Republican gubernatorial control in states electing all three positions. As this figure illustrates, the results for Republicans are again far less clear than those shown for Democratic control above. For instance, even when all three state executives are not co-partisans, Republican governors still lead to conservative shifts in state policy. The only other scenarios that lead to significant shifts in the conservative direction are when the secretary of state and treasurer are Republicans, respectively. All other scenarios produce inconsistent results, none of which are statistically significant. In fact, even when all three positions are co-partisans, Republican governors still only have a very slight conservative effect on state policy, which is also not statistically significant. Thus, there is a lack of any clear pattern among the results for Republican control.

There are a number of likely explanations for this divergence between Democratic and Republican control. Much of this stems from the differences between Democrats and Republicans and their governing philosophies. As Grossmann and Hopkins (2015) highlight, the two parties are not mirror images of each other and have real, fundamental differences, with Democrats much more focused on delivering for their constituencies through concrete government action while Republicans emphasize broader ideological principles rather than policy changes (also see Grossmann and Hopkins, 2016). Thus, the link between Republican control and conservative policy change is rather tenuous (Grossmann, 2019). For instance,

with Republicans, it may not always be about pushing policy in a conservative direction so much as simply preventing policy from moving in a liberal direction. To this end, blocking liberal policy initiatives may often be the desired policy outcome, even without significant change in the conservative direction. As a result, Democrats stand to benefit from a co-partisan AG far more than Republicans.

Table 3: The Effects of Democratic State Executives in Part-Time Legislatures, 1974-2019

	\Delta State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.02***	-0.01	0.01**	0.01*	0.01**	0.01	0.01**	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.03***	0.04***	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	-0.01	-0.02***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Sec. of State	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Treasurer	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. AG		0.03***						0.04***
		(0.01)						(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Sec. of State				0.00				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Treasurer						0.01		-0.01
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,530	1,530	1,292	1,292	1,378	1,378	1,140	1,140
R^2	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06
States	34	34	30	30	31	31	27	27
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4: The Effects of Republican State Executives in Part-Time Legislatures, 1974-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.01**	-0.01	-0.02**	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Secretary of State	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP AG		0.03***						0.04***
		(0.01)						(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Sec. of State				-0.00				-0.02
				(0.01)				(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Treasurer						0.02		-0.01
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,530	1,530	1,292	1,292	1,378	1,378	1,140	1,140
R-squared	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06
States	34	34	30	30	31	31	27	27
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

State Executive Control in Part-Time Legislatures

As previous scholars have found, governors tend to have greater influence over the policymaking process in states with less professionalized, part-time legislatures (Kousser and Phillips, 2012). The key factor is session length—governors (and state executives) are full-time positions, whereas in most states, legislators are only in session for a few months of the year. This imbalance inhibits these legislatures from providing the same check on the governor that full-time legislatures do (Marshall, 2006), as calling special sessions can be both costly and controversial(Kousser and Phillips, 2012). As a result, the partisan dynamics between state executives and governors discussed above are likely to be particularly strong in states with part-time legislatures, where governors have more policymaking power and independently-elected state executives should play a more significant role in checking the power of a governor from the opposing party. To examine this possibility, I separate the dataset according to the classifications of full- and part-time legislatures from the National Conference of State Legislatures (2017),[7] shown in Figure 8, and replicate the analyses above for part-time legislatures only. I rely on these broad groupings, rather than more precise measure of professionalism, because I am most interested in simply categorizing legislatures as either "full-time" or "part-time" for analysis rather than generating precise estimates. This has been done in other studies, such as Kousser and Phillips (2012).

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[7]The National Conference of State Legislatures classifies states as "Green", "Hybrid", or "Gold" legislatures. Green legislatures are the full-time, well-paid legislatures with large professional staffs, such as New York, California, and Michigan. Hybrid legislatures, which include states such as Maryland, North Carolina, and Texas, are part-time legislatures with medium-sized staffs and relatively low pay, such that most legislators have other sources of income. Finally, the Gold legislatures are part-time citizen legislatures, with very low pay and few staff, such as New Hampshire, Mississippi, and Idaho. For the purposes of analysis, I code the Green legislatures as "full-time" and all else as "part-time."

Figure 8: Full-Time and Part-Time State Legislatures

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (2017).

Table 2 contains the results of my baseline and interactive models for Democratic control in only those states with part-time legislatures. The baseline results in models 1, 3, 5, and 7 are similar to the results above. Consistent with my first hypothesis, the policy effects of Democratic governors are both positive and statistically significant at the .05-level, even in states where executive power is most dispersed among elected offices (model 7). Meanwhile, having Democratic majorities in the state House and state Senate, respectively, yield strong, statistically significant policy shifts in the liberal direction. Similar to the initial findings above, however, Democratic control of the attorney general, secretary of state, and state treasurer show virtually no independent effect on state policy liberalism.

Figure 9: Marginal Effects of Gubernatorial Control by State Executive Party in Part-Time Legislatures, 1974-2019

(a) Dem. Governor by AG Party*

(b) GOP Governor by AG Party*

(c) Dem. Governor by Sec. of State Party

(d) GOP Governor by Sec. of State Party

(e) Dem. Governor by Treasurer Party

(f) GOP Governor by Treasurer Party

Note: 95% confidence intervals reflect robust standard errors (clustered on states).
* pairwise comparison between marginal effects statistically significant at $p < 0.05$.

There is, however, strong evidence to support an interactive policy effect between governors and state attorneys general. The coefficient for a Democratic governor in model 2 shows that in the 34 states with both elected AGs and part-time legislatures, the effect of a Democratic governor on state policy liberalism is weakly negative and not statistically significant when the AG is a Republican (Independent). The coefficient on the interactive term is both positive and statistically significant at the .01-level, which indicates that the policy effect of a Democratic governor shifts considerably further in the liberal direction when the AG is a co-partisan. Interestingly, this is particularly strong in states that elect all three executives. While the coefficient for a Democratic governor in model 8 indicates that a Democratic governor has roughly no effect on liberal policy change when all three state executives are Republicans, the interactive effect of a Democratic governor paired with a Democratic AG is strong and statistically significant at the .01-level. Indeed, the effect of a Democratic governor and AG is about as strong as that of a Democratic House majority.

There is virtually no support for my third and fourth hypotheses in part-time legislatures. In model 4, Democratic governors have a positive effect on liberal policy change even when the secretary of state is a Republican, though the coefficient does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Further, there is no positive interactive effect, which suggests that having a Democratic secretary of state is no more advantageous for a Democratic governor than having a Republican serve in the role. There is at least slight support for my fourth hypothesis in model 6. Democratic governors have a positive effect on liberal policy change when the state treasurer is a Republican (Independent). Though this effect is not statistically significant, the coefficient on the interactive term indicates that this effect becomes stronger when the treasurer is also a Democrat, although the interactive effect is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, these effects dissipate and even reverse direction when looking at states that elect all three positions.

Table 4 presents the results for Republican control in states with part-time legisla-

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Figure 10: Figure 3: Marginal Effect of a Democratic Governor by State Executive Party in States Electing All Three Positions, Part-Time Legislatures, 1974-2019

Note: 95% confidence intervals reflect robust standard errors (clustered on states). Higher values indicate liberal policy shifts, lower values indicate conservative policy shifts.

tures. Like Democratic control, the results are largely similar to those above. There is again support for hypothesis 1. In each baseline model, the coefficient for a Republican governor is negative and statistically significant, indicating that having a Republican governor leads to policy shifts in the conservative direction. Republican AGs, secretaries of state, and treasurers, however, still have no independent policy effect. Further, there is again little evidence for hypotheses 2-4. In all but model 4, the coefficients for Republican governors are negative and statistically significant, which suggest that governors still push policy in a conservative direc-

Figure 11: Marginal Effect of a Republican Governor by State Executive Party in States Electing All Three Positions, Part-Time Legislatures, 1974-2019

Note: 95% confidence intervals reflect robust standard errors (clustered on states). Higher values indicate liberal policy shifts, lower values indicate conservative policy shifts.

tion even when these elected state executive are not co-partisans. Moreover, the coefficients on the interactive terms also do not support my hypotheses. The interactive coefficients for Republican AGs are positive and statistically significant, meaning that the effect of a Republican governor actually seems to moderate when the AG is a Republican rather than a Democrat or Independent. The same appears to be true of treasurers, though not in states that elect all three positions. While the interactive coefficients for Republican secretaries of state are in the hypothesized direction, they do not reach statistical significance.

Figure 9 plots the marginal effects from models 2, 4, and 6 in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively, showing the marginal effects of a Democratic governor, conditional on state executive partisan control. As expected, in states with part-time legislatures that elect their AGs, the marginal effect of a Democratic governor is strong and statistically significant when the state's elected attorney general is a Democrat, but has virtually no policy effect—even a slightly negative shift—when the attorney general is a Republican (Independent). Pairwise comparisons show that these marginal effects are statistically distinguishable from each other ($p < 0.05$). This suggests that particularly in states where the legislature is part-time and the AG plays a more prominent role in checking the power of the governor, having a co-partisan in the attorney general's office is crucial for a governor's ability to push state policy in their preferred ideological direction. A similar dynamic occurs with state treasurers, such that the marginal effect of a Democratic governor is statistically significant when the treasurer is a fellow Democrat, but not when the treasurer is a Republican (Independent). The conditional effect of a Democratic treasurer, however, is considerably weaker than that of a co-partisan attorney general, as the magnitude of the shifts illustrate. Partisan control of the secretary of state, meanwhile, still appears to have no effect.

The second column of Figure 9 shows the marginal effects for Republican control in states with part-time legislatures. In states that elect their AGs, the marginal effect of a Republican governor is negative and statistically significant when the AG is a Democrat (Independent), but not when the AG is a co-partisan. The same is true for state treasurers, with the marginal effect shifting in the liberal direction when the treasurer is a Republican versus a Democratic treasurer. There is very slight evidence for my hypothesis with secretaries of state—while not statistically significant when the secretary of state is a Democrat (Independent), the effect is negative and statistically significant when the secretary of state is a Republican.

The marginal effects of Democratic and Republican governors from states that elect

all three positions are shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11. Beginning with Democratic control, when all three state executives are Republicans (Independents), a Democratic governor has virtually no effect on state policy liberalism. This changes considerably, however, when the AG is a fellow Democrat. In every scenario with a Democratic AG, the marginal effect of a Democratic governor is positive and quite strong—even when the secretary of state and treasurer are Republicans. Indeed, the only negative shifts in policy liberalism come during those scenarios where the AG is not a Democrat. Interpreting this effect in light of the other interactions in the model, this means that in states where all three positions are elected, having a co-partisan control just the attorney general's office is enough for the governor to be effective in pushing their preferred policies. The secretary of state and treasurer, however, are less consequential for liberal policy change.

On the Republican side, the results from states that elect all three executive positions still show only weak support for my hypotheses. Contrary to my expectations, the effect of a Republican governor when all three positions are Democrats (Independents) is negative and statistically significant. The marginal effects move further in the conservative direction and are statistically significant when the secretary of state and treasurer are Republicans, but not for the AG. Moreover, when all three positions are co-partisans, the effect of a Republican governor on policy liberalism is virtually zero.

Finally, these findings are also robust to a battery of alternative model specifications. The full results of these robustness checks are presented in the Appendix. To summarize, even when including a lagged dependent variable (Appendix A.2), state and year fixed effects (Appendix A.3), a lagged dependent variable and state and year fixed effects (Appendix A.4), omitting the control variables (Appendix A.5), and expanding the dataset to include all states (rather than just those that elect their executives) (Appendix A.6), the key result holds— there is an interactive effect between governors and state AGs, with Democratic governors exhibiting a much greater policy effect when the state AG is a co-partisan. Moreover, the

results are also robust when using the levels of the outcome variable and following the approach of Caughey et al. (2017) (Appendix A.7).

6 Conclusion

In this paper, I examined how the policy effects of gubernatorial partisan control are conditioned by the partisan control of elected state executives. Relying on the dynamic measure of state policy liberalism from Caughey and Warshaw (2016), I utilized a series of panel models to assess how the ability of Democratic governors to enact liberal policy change is conditional on the election of co-partisans to key statewide posts. This empirical strategy revealed a number of key findings. Namely, while Democratic governors do lead to liberal policy change, this effect is conditioned on having a fellow Democrat in the state attorney general's office. When the AG is a Republican (Independent), the policy effect of a Democratic governor is negligible. These effects are particularly strong in states with part-time legislatures, where elected state executives play a more salient role in providing an intrabranch check on an opposing-party governor. There is no such effect, however, with secretaries of state or state treasurers.

These findings have a number of important implications for the study of state policy-making and partisan control. First, this analysis demonstrates that previous studies examining the effect of gubernatorial control on policy outcomes omit a key variable—one that strongly influences a governor's ability to push policy in their preferred ideological direction. Existing works have not accounted for the fact that the majority of governors must not only bargain with state legislatures, but contend with elected state executives, many of whom are not of the same political party as the governor. Nonetheless, these same executives often play key roles in the implementation of the governor's policy agenda, and if they disagree with the governor's policies, they are more likely to serve as barriers to implementation rather

than partners. Failing to account for this reality of state politics may ultimately explain why a number of studies examining the policy effects of gubernatorial control have produced inconclusive or contradictory results. Moving forward, state politics scholars studying the policy effects of governors should account for the partisan control of elected state executive offices—particularly attorneys general—in the same way that they would with chambers of the legislature.

The findings presented in this paper also call into question the applicability of comparisons between state governors and presidents. Many scholars who study governors often leverage theories of the presidency explain various aspects of gubernatorial politics (e.g., Bowman et al., 2010). Presidents, however, wield broad appointment power over the key positions in their administration, and can select appointees who not only agree with the president's policy proposals, but are committed to carrying them out (Lewis, 2008). Indeed, scholars have even shown that such appointments often correspond with major shifts in agency behavior (Wood and Waterman, 1991). With governors, this dynamic is vastly different. Whether the governor receives a team of friendly co-partisans or a pack of bureaucratic rivals is entirely up to the voters, with the fate of the governor's policy agenda hinging on the outcome. This ultimately suggests that applying theories of the presidency to state governors may only be appropriate in certain contexts, such as states where the governor enjoys broad appointment powers over key posts, such as the attorney general, or in states where the executive branch is comprised of co-partisans. Even in that case, however, scholars should still be careful, as even co-partisans in state executive positions may not share a commitment to the same policy priorities as the governor.

This paper also provides a number of avenues for future research. Scholars should continue to probe the policy effects of elected state executives in greater detail. Particular attention should be given to clarifying the specific causal mechanisms through which state executives influence policy change, with regards to both the legislative process, as well as

enactment and administration. For instance, there is much work to be done on understanding how elected state executives interact not only with governors, but with state legislatures. There is also valuable work to be done in the area of state executive elections. Researchers should examine the policy platforms of candidates for statewide offices (such as candidates for state attorneys general) and identify the types of issues that candidates for these offices run on, as well as how those policy platforms align with—or cut against—those of the governor and other state legislative leaders.

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Online Appendix

A.1: Summary Statistics of Variables — Table 1-2 Models

Summary Statistics, States Electing the Attorney General (Models 1-2)

Variables	Observations	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Democratic AG	1,884	0.631	0.483	0	1
Democratic Secretary of State	1,884	0.547	0.498	0	1
Democratic State Treasurer	1,884	0.587	0.493	0	1
Democratic Governor	1,884	0.508	0.500	0	1
Democratic State Senate	1,884	0.559	0.497	0	1
Democratic State House	1,884	0.594	0.491	0	1
GOP AG	1,884	0.369	0.483	0	1
GOP Secretary of State	1,884	0.453	0.498	0	1
GOP Treasurer	1,884	0.364	0.481	0	1
GOP Governor	1,884	0.482	0.500	0	1
GOP State Senate	1,884	0.426	0.495	0	1
GOP State House	1,884	0.391	0.488	0	1
Legislative Professionalism	1,884	0.115	1.579	-1.706	8.547
Citizen Ideology	1,884	48.72	15.48	8.450	97.00
Union Density	1,884	13.88	7.099	1.600	38.70

Summary Statistics, States Electing the Secretary of State (Models 3-4)

Variables	Observations	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Democratic AG	1,562	0.645	0.479	0	1
Democratic Secretary of State	1,562	0.544	0.498	0	1
Democratic State Treasurer	1,562	0.620	0.486	0	1
Democratic Governor	1,562	0.511	0.500	0	1
Democratic State Senate	1,562	0.562	0.496	0	1
Democratic State House	1,562	0.587	0.493	0	1
GOP AG	1,562	0.355	0.479	0	1
GOP Secretary of State	1,562	0.456	0.498	0	1
GOP State Treasurer	1,562	0.380	0.485	0	1
GOP Governor	1,562	0.478	0.500	0	1
GOP State Senate	1,562	0.424	0.494	0	1
GOP State House	1,562	0.396	0.489	0	1
Legislative Professionalism	1,562	-0.0363	1.535	-1.706	8.547
Citizen Ideology	1,562	48.56	15.35	8.450	97.00
Union Density	1,562	13.95	6.880	1.600	38.70

Summary Statistics, States Electing the State Treasurer (Models 5-6)

Variables	Observations	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Democratic AG	1,648	0.608	0.488	0	1
Democratic Secretary of State	1,648	0.518	0.500	0	1
Democratic State Treasurer	1,648	0.607	0.488	0	1
Democratic Governor	1,648	0.492	0.500	0	1
Democratic State Senate	1,648	0.560	0.497	0	1
Democratic State House	1,648	0.569	0.495	0	1
GOP AG	1,648	0.392	0.488	0	1
GOP Secretary of State	1,648	0.482	0.500	0	1
GOP State Treasurer	1,648	0.391	0.488	0	1
GOP Governor	1,648	0.498	0.500	0	1
GOP State Senate	1,648	0.428	0.495	0	1
GOP State House	1,648	0.420	0.494	0	1
Legislative Professionalism	1,648	-0.0221	1.464	-1.706	8.547
Citizen Ideology	1,648	47.64	15.79	8.450	97.00
Union Density	1,648	13.42	6.749	1.600	38.30

Summary Statistics, States Electing All Three Executive Positions (Models 7-8)

Variables	Observations	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Democratic AG	1,365	0.633	0.482	0	1
Democratic Secretary of State	1,365	0.549	0.498	0	1
Democratic State Treasurer	1,365	0.648	0.478	0	1
Democratic Governor	1,365	0.503	0.500	0	1
Democratic State Senate	1,365	0.599	0.490	0	1
Democratic State House	1,365	0.618	0.486	0	1
GOP AG	1,365	0.367	0.482	0	1
GOP Secretary of State	1,365	0.451	0.498	0	1
GOP State Treasurer	1,365	0.351	0.477	0	1
GOP Governor	1,365	0.484	0.500	0	1
GOP State Senate	1,365	0.390	0.488	0	1
GOP State House	1,365	0.368	0.483	0	1
Legislative Professionalism	1,365	-0.00692	1.500	-1.706	8.547
Citizen Ideology	1,365	49.27	15.63	8.450	97.00
Union Density	1,365	13.81	6.756	1.600	38.30

A.2: Robustness Analysis: Inclusion of Lagged Dependent Variable

Effect of Democratic State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.02***	-0.00	0.02***	0.02**	0.01***	0.01	0.01**	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Secretary of State	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Treasurer	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. AG		0.02**						0.02
		(0.01)						(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Sec. of State				-0.00				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.02)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Treasurer						0.01		-0.00
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,843	1,843	1,526	1,526	1,611	1,611	1,333	1,333
States	42	42	36	36	37	37	32	32
R-squared	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06
Lagged DV	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Effect of Republican State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.02***	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Secretary of State	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP AG		0.02*						0.03*
		(0.01)						(0.02)
GOP Gov. × GOP Sec. of State				-0.01				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.02)
GOP Gov. × GOP Treasurer						0.01		-0.00
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,843	1,843	1,526	1,526	1,611	1,611	1,333	1,333
States	42	42	36	36	37	37	32	32
R-squared	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06
Lagged DV	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Effect of Democratic State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, States with Part-Time Legislatures, 1975-2019

| | Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$ | | | | | | |
| | AG Elected | | SOS Elected | | Treasurer Elected | | All Three Elected | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.02***	-0.01	0.01**	0.01	0.02**	0.01	0.01**	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	0.04***	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	-0.01	-0.02***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Secretary of State	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Treasurer	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. AG		0.03***						0.04***
		(0.01)						(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. Sec. of State				0.00				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. Treasurer						0.01		-0.01
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,496	1,496	1,262	1,262	1,347	1,347	1,113	1,113
States	34	34	30	30	31	31	27	27
R-squared	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07
Lagged DV	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Effect of Republican State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, States with Part-Time Legislatures, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.01**	-0.01	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.01**	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	0.01	-0.01*	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Sec. of State	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP AG		0.03***						0.04***
		(0.01)						(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Sec. of State				-0.00				-0.02
				(0.01)				(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Treasurer						0.02		-0.01
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,496	1,496	1,262	1,262	1,347	1,347	1,113	1,113
R-squared	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07
States	34	34	30	30	31	31	27	27
Lagged DV	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A.3: Robustness Analysis: State and Year Fixed Effects

Effect of Democratic State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$
	\multicolumn{2}{c}{AG Elected}	\multicolumn{2}{c}{SOS Elected}	\multicolumn{2}{c}{Treasurer Elected}	\multicolumn{2}{c}{All Three Elected}
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.02***	0.00	0.02***	0.02**	0.01***	0.01	0.01***	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Secretary of State	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Treasurer	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. AG		0.02**						0.02
		(0.01)						(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Sec. of State				-0.01				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Treasurer						0.01		0.00
						(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	1,884	1,884	1,562	1,562	1,648	1,648	1,365	1,365
States	42	42	36	36	37	37	32	32
R-squared	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.10
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Effect of Republican State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Secretary of State	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP AG		0.02*						0.02
		(0.01)						(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Sec. of State				-0.01				-0.02
				(0.01)				(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Treasurer						0.01		0.00
						(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	1,884	1,884	1,562	1,562	1,648	1,648	1,365	1,365
R-squared	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.10
States	42	42	36	36	37	37	32	32
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Effect of Democratic State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, States with Part-Time Legislatures, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.02***	-0.00	0.01**	0.02**	0.02***	0.01	0.01**	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	0.04***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	-0.01	-0.02***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Secretary of State	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Treasurer	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. AG		0.03***						0.03**
		(0.01)						(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Sec. of State				-0.00				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Treasurer						0.01		-0.00
						(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	1,530	1,530	1,292	1,292	1,378	1,378	1,140	1,140
States	34	34	30	30	31	31	27	27
R-squared	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.11
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Effect of Republican State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, States with Part-Time Legislatures, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.01**	-0.01	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Secretary of State	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP AG		0.03***						0.04***
		(0.01)						(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Sec. of State				-0.01				-0.02
				(0.01)				(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Treasurer						0.02		-0.00
						(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	1,530	1,530	1,292	1,292	1,378	1,378	1,140	1,140
R-squared	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.11
States	34	34	30	30	31	31	27	27
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A.4: Robustness Analysis: State and Year Fixed Effects & Lagged Dependent Variable

Effect of Democratic State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.02***	0.00	0.02***	0.02**	0.02***	0.01	0.02***	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	0.04***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Secretary of State	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Treasurer	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. AG		0.02*						0.02
		(0.01)						(0.02)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. Sec. of State				-0.01				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.02)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. Treasurer						0.01		-0.00
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,843	1,843	1,526	1,526	1,611	1,611	1,333	1,333
States	42	42	36	36	37	37	32	32
R-squared	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.11
Lagged DV	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State and Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Effect of Republican State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02**	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Secretary of State	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. $\times$ GOP AG		0.02*						0.02
		(0.01)						(0.02)
GOP Gov. $\times$ GOP Sec. of State				-0.01				-0.02
				(0.01)				(0.01)
GOP Gov. $\times$ GOP Treasurer						0.01		0.00
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,843	1,843	1,526	1,526	1,611	1,611	1,333	1,333
R-squared	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.11
States	42	42	36	36	37	37	32	32
Lagged DV	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State and Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Effect of Democratic State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, States with Part-Time Legislatures, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.02***	-0.00	0.01**	0.02*	0.02***	0.01	0.01**	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	0.04***	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	-0.01	-0.02***	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Secretary of State	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Treasurer	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. AG		0.03***						0.04**
		(0.01)						(0.01)
Dem. Gov $\times$ Dem. Sec. of State				-0.00				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.02)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. Treasurer						0.01		-0.01
						(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	1,496	1,496	1,262	1,262	1,347	1,347	1,113	1,113
States	34	34	30	30	31	31	27	27
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12
Lagged DV	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State and Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

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Effect of Republican State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, States with Part-Time Legislatures, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.02**	-0.01	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Secretary of State	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP AG		0.03***						0.04***
		(0.01)						(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Sec. of State				-0.01				-0.02
				(0.01)				(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Treasurer						0.02		-0.01
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,496	1,496	1,262	1,262	1,347	1,347	1,113	1,113
States	34	34	30	30	31	31	27	27
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.12
Lagged DV	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State and Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

A.5: Robustness Analysis: No Control Variables

Effect of Democratic State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.01**	-0.00	0.01**	0.01*	0.01**	0.00	0.01**	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Secretary of State	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Treasurer	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01*	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. AG		0.02**						0.03*
		(0.01)						(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. Sec. of State				-0.00				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. Treasurer						0.01		-0.00
						(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	1,884	1,884	1,562	1,562	1,648	1,648	1,365	1,365
States	42	42	36	36	37	37	32	32
R-squared	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Effect of Republican State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, 1975-2019

| | \Delta State Policy Liberalism$_t$ | | | | | | | |
| | AG Elected | | SOS Elected | | Treasurer Elected | | All Three Elected | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.01*	-0.01**	-0.02**	-0.01**	-0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	-0.00	-0.01**	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Secretary of State	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01**	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP AG		0.02**						0.03*
		(0.01)						(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Sec. of State				-0.01				-0.02
				(0.01)				(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Treasurer						0.01		-0.00
						(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	1,884	1,884	1,562	1,562	1,648	1,648	1,365	1,365
States	42	42	36	36	37	37	32	32
R-squared	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Effect of Democratic State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, States with Part-Time Legislatures, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.01**	-0.01	0.01*	0.01	0.01**	0.00	0.01*	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	-0.00	-0.02**	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Secretary of State	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Treasurer	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. AG		0.03***						0.04***
		(0.01)						(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. Sec. of State				-0.00				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.01)
Dem. Gov. $\times$ Dem. Treasurer						0.01		-0.01
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,530	1,530	1,292	1,292	1,378	1,378	1,140	1,140
States	34	34	30	30	31	31	27	27
R-squared	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Effect of Republican State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, States with Part-Time Legislatures, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.01**	-0.02***	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.01**	-0.02**	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	0.00	-0.01*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Secretary of State	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. $\times$ GOP AG		0.03***						0.04***
		(0.01)						(0.01)
GOP Gov. $\times$ GOP Sec. of State				-0.00				-0.02*
				(0.01)				(0.01)
GOP Gov. $\times$ GOP Treasurer						0.02		-0.01
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,530	1,530	1,292	1,292	1,378	1,378	1,140	1,140
States	34	34	30	30	31	31	27	27
R-squared	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

A.6: Robustness Analysis: All States

Effect of Democratic State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.01***	-0.00	0.01***	0.02**	0.01***	0.00	0.01***	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Secretary of State	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Treasurer	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. AG		0.02**						0.02**
		(0.01)						(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Sec. of State				-0.00				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Treasurer						0.01		0.01
						(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	2,205	2,205	2,205	2,205	2,205	2,205	2,205	2,205
States	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
R-squared	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Effect of Republican State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, 1975-2019

	\Delta State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02**	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	-0.00	-0.01**	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Secretary of State	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP AG		0.02**						0.03**
		(0.01)						(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Sec. of State				-0.00				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Treasurer						0.01		0.00
						(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	2,205	2,205	2,205	2,205	2,205	2,205	2,205	2,205
States	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
R-squared	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Effect of Democratic State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, States with Part-Time Legislatures, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.01***	-0.01	0.01***	0.02**	0.01***	0.01	0.01***	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	-0.00	-0.02**	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Secretary of State	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Treasurer	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. AG		0.03***						0.03***
		(0.01)						(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Sec. of State				-0.00				-0.01
				(0.01)				(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Treasurer						0.01		0.00
						(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	1,755	1,755	1,755	1,755	1,755	1,755	1,755	1,755
R-squared	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
States	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Effect of Republican State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, States with Part-Time Legislatures, 1975-2019

	Δ State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02**	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	0.00	-0.01**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Secretary of State	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP AG		0.03***						0.04***
		(0.01)						(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Sec. of State				-0.00				-0.02*
				(0.01)				(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP Treasurer						0.01		0.01
						(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	1,755	1,755	1,755	1,755	1,755	1,755	1,755	1,755
States	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39
R-squared	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

A.7: Robustness Analysis: Caughey et al. (2017) Approach

Effect of Democratic State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, 1977-2019

| | State Policy Liberalism$_t$ | | | | | | | |
| | AG Elected | | SOS Elected | | Treasurer Elected | | All Three Elected | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.02***	0.01	0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	0.01	0.02***	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Secretary of State	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Treasurer	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. AG		0.01						0.02
		(0.01)						(0.02)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Sec. of State				-0.01				-0.02
				(0.01)				(0.02)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Treasurer						0.00		-0.01
						(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	1,843	1,843	1,526	1,526	1,611	1,611	1,333	1,333
States	42	42	36	36	37	37	32	32
R-squared	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.92
Two Lagged DVs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State and Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Effect of Republican State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, 1977-2019

	State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01*	-0.02***	-0.02**	-0.02***	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Secretary of State	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP AG		0.01						0.02
		(0.01)						(0.02)
GOP Gov. × GOP Sec. of State				-0.02				-0.02
				(0.01)				(0.02)
GOP Gov. × GOP Treasurer						0.00		-0.00
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,843	1,843	1,526	1,526	1,611	1,611	1,333	1,333
States	42	42	36	36	37	37	32	32
R-squared	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.92
Two Lagged DVs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State and Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Effect of Democratic State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, States with Part-Time Legislatures, 1977-2019

	State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democratic Governor	0.02***	0.00	0.02**	0.02**	0.02***	0.02	0.01**	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State House	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Senate	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Attorney General	-0.00	-0.01*	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic Secretary of State	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democratic State Treasurer	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. AG		0.02**						0.03**
		(0.01)						(0.01)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Sec. of State				-0.01				-0.02
				(0.01)				(0.02)
Dem. Gov. × Dem. Treasurer						0.00		-0.01
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,496	1,496	1,262	1,262	1,347	1,347	1,113	1,113
R-squared	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92
States	34	34	30	30	31	31	27	27
Two Lagged DVs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State and Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Effect of Republican State Executive Control on State Policy Liberalism, States with Part-Time Legislatures, 1977-2019

	State Policy Liberalism$_t$							
	AG Elected		SOS Elected		Treasurer Elected		All Three Elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Governor	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.02**	-0.01	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02**	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State House	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Senate	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Attorney General	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Secretary of State	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP State Treasurer	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GOP Gov. × GOP AG		0.02**						0.04**
		(0.01)						(0.02)
GOP Gov. × GOP Sec. of State				-0.01				-0.02
				(0.01)				(0.02)
GOP Gov. × GOP Treasurer						0.01		-0.01
						(0.01)		(0.02)
Observations	1,496	1,496	1,262	1,262	1,347	1,347	1,113	1,113
States	34	34	30	30	31	31	27	27
R-squared	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92
Two Lagged DVs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State and Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control Variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Linear coefficients; constants not shown; robust standard errors (clustered on states) in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1